Scarletwine
New Yorker
This time by several in the 82nd Airborne.
This is in Time and several other magazines. This the combined report.
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/
Leadership Failure
Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division
. Summary
II. Account of Sergeant A, 82nd Airborne Division
III. Account of Sergeant B, 82nd Airborne Division
IV. Account of Officer C, 82nd Airborne Division
On Conditions at FOB Mercury
On Frustration Obtaining a Meaningful Response within the Military Chain of Command
On Policy Confusion within the Ranks on Coercive Interrogation
On the Implications of the Abu Ghraib Abuse Revelations in April 2004
On Failure of the Officer Corps
On the Role of “OGA”
V. Conclusion
Captain Ian Fishback has given us permission to state that he is the captain referenced in our report in light of the subsequent revelation of his name by Congressional offices.
I wish we could just get the hell out of this situation.
This is in Time and several other magazines. This the combined report.
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/
Leadership Failure
Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division
. Summary
II. Account of Sergeant A, 82nd Airborne Division
III. Account of Sergeant B, 82nd Airborne Division
IV. Account of Officer C, 82nd Airborne Division
On Conditions at FOB Mercury
On Frustration Obtaining a Meaningful Response within the Military Chain of Command
On Policy Confusion within the Ranks on Coercive Interrogation
On the Implications of the Abu Ghraib Abuse Revelations in April 2004
On Failure of the Officer Corps
On the Role of “OGA”
V. Conclusion
Captain Ian Fishback has given us permission to state that he is the captain referenced in our report in light of the subsequent revelation of his name by Congressional offices.
I wish we could just get the hell out of this situation.