Israel Tells the U.S. It Will Retaliate if Attacked by Iraq
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
JERUSALEM, Sept. 21 ? Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has informed the Bush administration that he plans to strike back if Iraq attacks Israel, according to Israeli and Western officials.
Mr. Sharon's statements, made privately to senior American officials in recent weeks, represent a major shift in Israeli thinking since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when 39 Iraqi Scud missiles struck without any Israeli response.
The prime minister's position reflects a widespread belief among Israeli politicians and generals that Arab leaders perceived Israel's restraint in 1991 as weakness. Throughout his military and political career, Mr. Sharon has always held that any attack on Israel must be promptly and powerfully punished.
"I don't think there is a scenario in which Israel will get hit and not strike back," a senior Western official said. "I think the evolving strategy will be commensurate response."
Mr. Sharon's position has significant implications for the Pentagon, which fears that an Israeli entry would stir up Arab public opinion and make it harder for the Pentagon to maintain cooperation from the Arab states where Washington hopes to base American forces.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told Congress on Thursday that it would be in Israel's "overwhelming best interests" not to intervene if the United States went to war with Iraq.
The Pentagon is also planning military steps to reduce the Iraqi threat to Israel and obviate the need for an Israeli retaliatory strike. Israeli officials say they have been told by their American counterparts that the United States will mount an intensive campaign to destroy Iraqi missile launchers in western Iraq, an operation that would almost certainly require the use of American commandos in addition to airstrikes.
American officials have also assured the Israelis that they will receive adequate warning of when the American attack will begin, though American officials have not said how much notice they will provide.
The United States has also quietly installed a data link to rush early warning of Iraqi missile launchings to Israeli commanders. The information would be gathered by American satellites and sent by the United States to Israel's Air Force headquarters, Israeli officials said. From there, the warning data could be sent to Israel's antimissile batteries and Israel's Home Front Command, which has responsibility for civil defense, as well as to Israeli air commanders.
Current and former Israeli officials said the arrangement provided additional warning time and was one reason why Israel had a better chance of defending against an Iraqi missile attack and protecting its civilians than during the 1991 war.
Still, most Israelis believe that the nation needs to retaliate if it is attacked, as does the Israeli leadership. According to a recent poll by the newspaper Yediot Ahronot, 70 percent of Israelis believe that the nation should retaliate if it is subjected to the same sort of Scud attacks it endured in 1991; those attacks, on 17 days spread over five weeks, killed two Israelis in direct hits, and four others suffocated in their gas masks.
"There are many more options now for Israel to be defended," said David Ivri, Israel's former ambassador to Washington and a senior defense official during the gulf war.
"The Iraqi side is less effective," he said, and experts think that Iraq has far fewer Scuds than it did the last time. Also, he added, "we have better early warning combined with the U.S.
"But there is also much more of a tendency to respond this time," Mr. Irvi said. "Otherwise, we will lose deterrence. We did not retaliate in 1991. If we do not retaliate another time, neighboring countries may think we do not have confidence in our ability."
While there is broad political and popular support for retaliation, not all Israelis believe that the policy is necessary in every case. Some officials suggested that it might be difficult to ignore American appeals for restraint if a Scud missile landed in an empty lot or off the coast of Israel. And some Israeli experts argue that there is little the Israelis could do to hurt Saddam Hussein's government that the Americans would not be doing already.
"When you retaliate, you really need to do something that is impressive," said Shai Feldman, who runs the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. "It is not that easy to do something impressive when a much larger American bombing capability is already in operation."
But the current debate in Israel turns more on arguments about deterrence and the need to demonstrate national resolve than strictly military considerations.
The debate over retaliation is an echo of the gulf war. The concern then was that Mr. Hussein's government would try to draw Israel into the conflict in an effort to split the American and Arab military coalition. The Israeli military drew up plans to intervene, including an operation to send Israeli commandos into western Iraq to destroy Scud launchers. The United States urged Israel to stay out of the war and promised to neutralize the Scud threat.
The Scud is a surface-to-surface missile, which Iraq used during its war with Iran , as well as against Israel and targets in the Persian Gulf in 1991. It was very inaccurate and sometimes broke up in flight. But Iraq wanted the missiles to terrorize and demoralize its foes. A Scud killed dozens of American soldiers at a barracks near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991.
American and British efforts to stop or disrupt the Iraqi Scud firings were only marginally successful. To encourage Israel to stay out of the fight, the United States sent American-manned Patriot antimissile batteries to Israel and allowed the Israeli military to pick bombing targets for allied airstrikes.
The 1991 war established a pattern of military cooperation between Israel and the United States, which has been expanded. The establishment of the early warning data link early warning data is one example.
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
JERUSALEM, Sept. 21 ? Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has informed the Bush administration that he plans to strike back if Iraq attacks Israel, according to Israeli and Western officials.
Mr. Sharon's statements, made privately to senior American officials in recent weeks, represent a major shift in Israeli thinking since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when 39 Iraqi Scud missiles struck without any Israeli response.
The prime minister's position reflects a widespread belief among Israeli politicians and generals that Arab leaders perceived Israel's restraint in 1991 as weakness. Throughout his military and political career, Mr. Sharon has always held that any attack on Israel must be promptly and powerfully punished.
"I don't think there is a scenario in which Israel will get hit and not strike back," a senior Western official said. "I think the evolving strategy will be commensurate response."
Mr. Sharon's position has significant implications for the Pentagon, which fears that an Israeli entry would stir up Arab public opinion and make it harder for the Pentagon to maintain cooperation from the Arab states where Washington hopes to base American forces.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told Congress on Thursday that it would be in Israel's "overwhelming best interests" not to intervene if the United States went to war with Iraq.
The Pentagon is also planning military steps to reduce the Iraqi threat to Israel and obviate the need for an Israeli retaliatory strike. Israeli officials say they have been told by their American counterparts that the United States will mount an intensive campaign to destroy Iraqi missile launchers in western Iraq, an operation that would almost certainly require the use of American commandos in addition to airstrikes.
American officials have also assured the Israelis that they will receive adequate warning of when the American attack will begin, though American officials have not said how much notice they will provide.
The United States has also quietly installed a data link to rush early warning of Iraqi missile launchings to Israeli commanders. The information would be gathered by American satellites and sent by the United States to Israel's Air Force headquarters, Israeli officials said. From there, the warning data could be sent to Israel's antimissile batteries and Israel's Home Front Command, which has responsibility for civil defense, as well as to Israeli air commanders.
Current and former Israeli officials said the arrangement provided additional warning time and was one reason why Israel had a better chance of defending against an Iraqi missile attack and protecting its civilians than during the 1991 war.
Still, most Israelis believe that the nation needs to retaliate if it is attacked, as does the Israeli leadership. According to a recent poll by the newspaper Yediot Ahronot, 70 percent of Israelis believe that the nation should retaliate if it is subjected to the same sort of Scud attacks it endured in 1991; those attacks, on 17 days spread over five weeks, killed two Israelis in direct hits, and four others suffocated in their gas masks.
"There are many more options now for Israel to be defended," said David Ivri, Israel's former ambassador to Washington and a senior defense official during the gulf war.
"The Iraqi side is less effective," he said, and experts think that Iraq has far fewer Scuds than it did the last time. Also, he added, "we have better early warning combined with the U.S.
"But there is also much more of a tendency to respond this time," Mr. Irvi said. "Otherwise, we will lose deterrence. We did not retaliate in 1991. If we do not retaliate another time, neighboring countries may think we do not have confidence in our ability."
While there is broad political and popular support for retaliation, not all Israelis believe that the policy is necessary in every case. Some officials suggested that it might be difficult to ignore American appeals for restraint if a Scud missile landed in an empty lot or off the coast of Israel. And some Israeli experts argue that there is little the Israelis could do to hurt Saddam Hussein's government that the Americans would not be doing already.
"When you retaliate, you really need to do something that is impressive," said Shai Feldman, who runs the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. "It is not that easy to do something impressive when a much larger American bombing capability is already in operation."
But the current debate in Israel turns more on arguments about deterrence and the need to demonstrate national resolve than strictly military considerations.
The debate over retaliation is an echo of the gulf war. The concern then was that Mr. Hussein's government would try to draw Israel into the conflict in an effort to split the American and Arab military coalition. The Israeli military drew up plans to intervene, including an operation to send Israeli commandos into western Iraq to destroy Scud launchers. The United States urged Israel to stay out of the war and promised to neutralize the Scud threat.
The Scud is a surface-to-surface missile, which Iraq used during its war with Iran , as well as against Israel and targets in the Persian Gulf in 1991. It was very inaccurate and sometimes broke up in flight. But Iraq wanted the missiles to terrorize and demoralize its foes. A Scud killed dozens of American soldiers at a barracks near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991.
American and British efforts to stop or disrupt the Iraqi Scud firings were only marginally successful. To encourage Israel to stay out of the fight, the United States sent American-manned Patriot antimissile batteries to Israel and allowed the Israeli military to pick bombing targets for allied airstrikes.
The 1991 war established a pattern of military cooperation between Israel and the United States, which has been expanded. The establishment of the early warning data link early warning data is one example.
