I apologize for the length. The short version of my response is that I am right, and that the U.S Senate thinks I’m right. With respect to Saddam’s conventional military threat, these are the assessments of the Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence:
Its ok, its not the first time the US Senate intelligence committee(which is not the entire US Senate I should add) has put out something that is simply inaccurate.
Its funny but the very article you site actually has this in it:
The military's view in the document was that Iraq had ''at least some chance'' of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.
Thats BEYOND what I have described Saddam's post 1991 Gulf War capabilities to be which I felt were limited to Kuwait, but could grow larger because of the collapse of sanctions and the weapons embargo.
The committee's report implies that war opponents were essentially correct when they argued that Iraq posed little immediate threat to the United States. Before the war, those who held this view, both in Congress and at the United Nations, argued that continued containment was preferable to an invasion.
Continued containment required a fully functioning sanctions regime and weapons embargo, both of which essentially did not exist by 2002 except on paper. It also required that Saddam be complying with the UN inspections regime which he had not been doing since the mid-1990s. There was nothing left of sanctions or the weapons embargo across the entire Syrian/Iraq border by 2002. Countries like France, Russia and China were regularly violating both sanctions and the weapons embargo with China starting the process to update Iraq's air defense system just prior to the start of the war in 2003. Saddam was making Billions of dollars in black market oil sales every year since 2000. From this point on, every year that the United States and its Allies let go by without removing Saddam, was another year Saddam would have to rebuild his military strength, obtain new advanced weapon systems, and increase the cost of any military confrontation the United States would have with Iraq in the future. The biggest threat was not Saddam's specific capabilities at any one point in time, but his intentions, past behavior, and the unpredictability of his actions at the head of country that had natural resources of wealth which could be turned toward any crazy adventure he wanted in the future. The goal of US and Gulf defense policy ever since the crises of 1990 was to prevent such a crises from ever occuring again, not to simply react to a new crises. The red line in the sand would not be another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but Saddam's failure to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions and any leaks or complete collapses in the Sanctions and weapons embargo regime.
After reviewing about 400 analytical documents written by the intelligence agencies from 1991, after the first gulf war, to 2003, when Mr. Hussein was toppled, the committee unanimously concluded that ''the body of assessments showed that Iraqi military capabilities had steadily degraded following defeat in the first gulf war in 1991. Analysts also believed those capabilities would continue to erode as long as economic sanctions remained in place.''
No one has ever for a second doubted that there had been an erosion of Iraqi military capabilities from where they stood in 1991 to where they were in 2003, as well a little over 50% cut in total force levels and equipment levels from the Iraqi military position prior to the 1991 Gulf War. Despite those factors, the US military and the CIA correctly concluded that the Iraqi's still had the capability to cause serious harm in the Gulf if they fully committed what they still had to such an operation. The economic sanctions that the Analysts on the Senate intelligence committee speak of, essentially did not exist any more by 2002 except on paper.
No, my claim is that Saddam's conventional military was not dangerous to the US because those large scary numbers you quoted were actually in the context of obsolete equipment, poor to non-existent morale and a world power with troops next door. This was conclusively demonstrated during the two Gulf Wars, when we actually fought him. And, uh, by the US government report.
You, however, claimed that Saddam was one of the biggest threats to US and global security in 2003, and cited this:
and from the very article you cited, the US MILITARY had this to say about the matter:
The military's view in the document was that Iraq had ''at least some chance'' of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.
Thats all you need to be considered one of the biggest threats to US and global security in 2003 without even going into the detail of multiple other issues. That technical capability combined with Saddam's past behavior, intentions, and failure to comply with the UN inspections regime, and the collapse of sanctions and the weapons embargo, are why removing Saddam became a necessity.
Again, by your logic, the Taliban was not much of a threat because the US only lost one person in removing it from power in Afghanistan which is absurd.
Saying "oh, well it's what he could have had" in some fanciful future where Saddam is inexplicably left alone to develop a quality military is inarguably shifting the goal posts.
No, its recognizing the reality that what ever you believe Saddam's current capabilities were in 2003, he could easily develop and build new capabilities as well as improving those that he already had, especially now that the sanctions and weapons embargo had collapsed. The Military and the CIA recogonized correctly that Saddam's degraded position was NOT irreversible as you some how magically believe. That fact singificantly raises the cost each year that you wait to do what is needed. Removing Saddam in 2003 before he could gain greater capabilities than he already had then has saved the lives of US military personal as well as Iraqi lives too.
You responded to Dieman by saying Iraq had these and therefore was dangerous. U.S intelligence disagreed.
No an article you qouted from said a Senate Intelligence committee's assessment several years ago implied that.
The US military clearly did not agree as qouted in the article:
The military's view in the document was that Iraq had ''at least some chance'' of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.
Again, well beyond what even I thought Iraq was capable of doing at the time.
The fact is, any aggressive action toward neighboring countries after the Gulf War would be clear cause for the UN sanctioning war eliminating the regime.
No, the line was drawn in the sand well ahead of that. The international community was not going to wait for Saddam to re-invade Kuwait and have a repeat of the 1990-1991 crises. Failure to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolutions was the line in the sand and Saddam never fully complied with the resolutions, which ultimately why it became a necessity to remove him. UN resolutions before and after the first Gulf War authorized military action against Saddam if he failed to comply with current UN resolutions or subsequent ones. UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 all authorize military action to enforce the resolutions in the face of non-compliance by Iraq.
The Iraqi Navy
Why continue to bring that up, when I have not once mentioned the Iraqi Navy?
This is wildly unrealistic for a tinpot dictator in the Middle East to ever develop the capability to do with US forces hovering over the country. Again: you cite the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War as a comparable threat to US deployment. Is Iraq going to bomb our bases with their stealth aircraft? Will they discover our secret bases with their numerous satellites? I see you covered your bases by saying Saddam didn't have any of these capabilities but we couldn't have waited- and we cannot wait until he builds a Space Laser! Then he can shoot down our satellites and hold the world hostage! We must invade Iraq before the Space Laser is built. If you object you are an appeaser.
Saddam is crazy...enough not do things because they're too crazy
Anyone with the right resources can develop capabilities that in certain situations would indeed be a serious threat to US security. The Russian and Chinese military's could not at the time move ground forces into Kuwait to sieze the oil fields, but Saddam could as the military stated, possibly all the way into Saudi Arabia as mentioned in your article:
The military's view in the document was that Iraq had ''at least some chance'' of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.
Then he would have overreached and been destroyed? You should probably look at a map of the Middle East, and compare the size of Saudi Arabia to Kuwait.
The vast majority of military experts concede that if Iraq had not stopped in Kuwait in 1990 and moved into Saudi Arabia, the world would be facing its worst crises ever do to the degree that the global economy was dependent on Saudi oil. By the way, Saddam would not have to take every square inch of Saudi sand, all he would need is the oil fields bunched up near the border with Kuwait as well as the key coastal ports. Then its goodby Saudi and Kuwaiti oil for the world market, and goodby bases needed in order to deploy a force to remove Saddam's forces. A crises that only caused a global recession, would have turned into a crises that caused a global depression and the length of time needed to try and rectify the situation as well as the cost of doing so would have skyrocketed, and may have proved to be too late as too much damage to the global economy may have been done by then.
Oh, and the US military is well aware of the size of Saudi Arabia vs. Kuwait and had this to say about potential Iraqi agression long after the first Gulf War:
The military's view in the document was that Iraq had ''at least some chance'' of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.