Irvine511
Blue Crack Supplier
i returned to it several times, but here is my original post on 1441 (from 2005!):
[q]In regards 1441, I’d like to point out that you ignored the assurances by Negroponte and Greenstock assured everyone that it was not a green light for an invasion. You say it was; they say it wasn’t. Why did Tony Blair work furiously for another resolution to authorize force (one that France said it would veto) if 1441 is as clear an authorization for war as you make it out to be? Finally, and this is an important point: it is up to the Security Council itself, and not individual members, to determine how the body's resolutions are to be enforced. What 1441 says and doesn’t say isn’t for the United States to decide.
Another point: resolution 678 contains the phrase “all necessary means." 1441 does not.
Clearly, you are in the wrong here. Anyway …
Resolution 1441 offered Iraq a final opportunity to disarmam and to provide a complete disclosure of weapons as required by Resolution 687, and “serious consequences” were threatened. Resolution 1441 threatens "serious consequences" if these are not met. It reasserted demands that UN weapons inspectors should have "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to sites of their choosing, in order to ascertain compliance. Let’s note that Iraq agreed to 1441 on November 13 and Blix and ElBaradei returned to Iraq later that month, and in December Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet requirements for this resolution. Each successive Blix report – in january, february, and march – noted a greater level of Iraqi compliance. No, not nearly enough, but enough to convince many nations that the disarmament of Iraq was achieveable without a direct, unilateral invasion by the United States.
I also can’t believe you would just gloss over the furious debate over 1441 and whether or not it authorizes military action – simply because you believe it to be an authorization does not make it an open-and-shut case. You’d do well to acknowledge that, yes, other viewpoints are equally valid, or at least acknowledge that other viewpoints exist. What I think irritates myself, and most other people, about your posts is the presentation of a stark, black-and-white reality as total fact, whereas anyone with a brain and a television and newspapers knows just how contentious all of this was, and to dismiss the opinion of the rest of the world and close to half of the American population isn’t just arrogant, it’s foolish.
I would also note that the impetus to avoid war comes from nations, unlike the United States, who have seen the effects and aftermath of war in the 20th century on their own soil. Many do not believe that war is an effective geopolitical tool, and that war should not only be the absolute last option, but that it is always the worst option.
I agree that, at some point in time, a war might have been inevitable, or at least some sort of military conflict with Hussein. But to assert that it had to happen then, in March of 2003, is firstly incorrect, and it also guaranteed that worldwide popular opinion against the US would be at a maximum making it impossible for politicians to support the US lest they face the electoral consequences at home. The result, you see, is that US troops have proved to be inadquate to successfullly occupy the country, something that might have been achieveable with the broad international support similar to the coalition formed in 1991. don’t you see that, even if the legal case is correct, that popular support is just as crucial for the successful implementation of the mission. If you believe so mightily in the removal of Saddam for the myriad reasons you’ve laid out, why not take the time to actually build a coalition so that you can be successful?
The reason, I think, was that Rumsfeld, especially, wanted and needed a unilateral invasion to demonstrate the capabilities of the US forces, the whole “shock and awe” scenario. While the US was certainly capable of overthrowing the vastly weakened Iraqi army without much of a problem, maintaining security on the ground in the face of an insurgency that might have as many as 200,000 supporters has proven to be much, much more difficult than anyone in the White House imagined.
Might French troops, German troops, or the troops from any other Arab nation have been helpful? Might we be toasting the success of the invasion today – instead of having it turn, politically, into another Vietnam as a strong majority of the American public thinks the war wasn’t worth it – had the Bush administration showed patience not with Saddam, but with getting the rest of the world on board?
What your posts demonstrate, to me, is precisely the arrogant, of-course-I’m-right attitude of the Bush administration that doesn’t do much when it comes to assembling broad support – and please contrast this with Bush 1 and Jim Baker. It’s no secret that Bush is famously incurious, famously isolated, and famously uninterested in the opinions of anyone other than his group of yes-men. I think an argument can be made to support an invasion of Iraq *if done correctly*, but I think it’s also true that this president, in particular, was uniquely unsuited for the task at hand.
[/q]
another great point was brought up by Dread. he linked to this article from the right wing National Review:
[q]Resolution 1483 wisely limits the U.N.'s role to one of consultation and coordination, given its manifest failures at nation building in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.
Resolution 1483 puts the Security Council in the curious position of legitimizing the postwar Anglo-American military occupation of Iraq without ever having addressed how U.S. and British forces got there in the first place. This is not, however, unfamiliar territory for the council. In the run-up to NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the chief proponents of intervention — once again, the Americans and the British — decided not to seek Security Council authorization in the face of a certain Russian (and possible Chinese) veto, even though the council had repeatedly determined that the situation in Kosovo was a "threat to international peace and security" — the legal predicate for mandatory sanctions and military action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. After Serb forces were driven from Kosovo by a U.S.-led air campaign, Resolution 1244 retroactively ratified the settlement terms that NATO imposed on the defeated Serbs without the council ever voting on the legality or legitimacy of the military action that brought about the settlement. Then, as now, the Security Council chose to overlook the elephant in the room.
Connoisseurs of Security Council precedent will note that the council has now bestowed retroactive legitimacy on military intervention against a member state in precisely the same number of instances (twice) that it has granted prior authorization for armed intervention in interstate conflicts (Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990-1). So much for the council's claimed monopoly on prior approval of all arguably nondefensive uses of military force.
Resolution 1483 also marks the demise of the so-called Axis of Weasels, that unnatural ménage a trios pulled apart by the centripetal forces of divergent national interests among the French, Germans, and Russians. This bouleversement — a reversal of fortune in the diplomatic parlance of Old Europe — has left Paris increasingly isolated as Berlin and Moscow set about conciliating Washington. Hence the uncharacteristically emollient tone struck Thursday by France's egregious foreign minister, M. de Villepin. "Even if this text does not go as far as we would like," he said, "we have decided to vote for this resolution. This is because we have chosen the path of unity of the international community." One hopes this path of unity is reachable only by way of a steep learning curve demonstrating the consequences of gratuitously obstructing vital U.S. national interests.
This is a teachable moment for the U.N. as well. Where vital U.S. national interests are at stake, the U.N.'s remaining relevance and authority depend entirely on that body's willingness to assist or at least acquiesce in U.S. efforts to maintain minimum world public order. This remains to be seen.[/q]
[q]In regards 1441, I’d like to point out that you ignored the assurances by Negroponte and Greenstock assured everyone that it was not a green light for an invasion. You say it was; they say it wasn’t. Why did Tony Blair work furiously for another resolution to authorize force (one that France said it would veto) if 1441 is as clear an authorization for war as you make it out to be? Finally, and this is an important point: it is up to the Security Council itself, and not individual members, to determine how the body's resolutions are to be enforced. What 1441 says and doesn’t say isn’t for the United States to decide.
Another point: resolution 678 contains the phrase “all necessary means." 1441 does not.
Clearly, you are in the wrong here. Anyway …
Resolution 1441 offered Iraq a final opportunity to disarmam and to provide a complete disclosure of weapons as required by Resolution 687, and “serious consequences” were threatened. Resolution 1441 threatens "serious consequences" if these are not met. It reasserted demands that UN weapons inspectors should have "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to sites of their choosing, in order to ascertain compliance. Let’s note that Iraq agreed to 1441 on November 13 and Blix and ElBaradei returned to Iraq later that month, and in December Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet requirements for this resolution. Each successive Blix report – in january, february, and march – noted a greater level of Iraqi compliance. No, not nearly enough, but enough to convince many nations that the disarmament of Iraq was achieveable without a direct, unilateral invasion by the United States.
I also can’t believe you would just gloss over the furious debate over 1441 and whether or not it authorizes military action – simply because you believe it to be an authorization does not make it an open-and-shut case. You’d do well to acknowledge that, yes, other viewpoints are equally valid, or at least acknowledge that other viewpoints exist. What I think irritates myself, and most other people, about your posts is the presentation of a stark, black-and-white reality as total fact, whereas anyone with a brain and a television and newspapers knows just how contentious all of this was, and to dismiss the opinion of the rest of the world and close to half of the American population isn’t just arrogant, it’s foolish.
I would also note that the impetus to avoid war comes from nations, unlike the United States, who have seen the effects and aftermath of war in the 20th century on their own soil. Many do not believe that war is an effective geopolitical tool, and that war should not only be the absolute last option, but that it is always the worst option.
I agree that, at some point in time, a war might have been inevitable, or at least some sort of military conflict with Hussein. But to assert that it had to happen then, in March of 2003, is firstly incorrect, and it also guaranteed that worldwide popular opinion against the US would be at a maximum making it impossible for politicians to support the US lest they face the electoral consequences at home. The result, you see, is that US troops have proved to be inadquate to successfullly occupy the country, something that might have been achieveable with the broad international support similar to the coalition formed in 1991. don’t you see that, even if the legal case is correct, that popular support is just as crucial for the successful implementation of the mission. If you believe so mightily in the removal of Saddam for the myriad reasons you’ve laid out, why not take the time to actually build a coalition so that you can be successful?
The reason, I think, was that Rumsfeld, especially, wanted and needed a unilateral invasion to demonstrate the capabilities of the US forces, the whole “shock and awe” scenario. While the US was certainly capable of overthrowing the vastly weakened Iraqi army without much of a problem, maintaining security on the ground in the face of an insurgency that might have as many as 200,000 supporters has proven to be much, much more difficult than anyone in the White House imagined.
Might French troops, German troops, or the troops from any other Arab nation have been helpful? Might we be toasting the success of the invasion today – instead of having it turn, politically, into another Vietnam as a strong majority of the American public thinks the war wasn’t worth it – had the Bush administration showed patience not with Saddam, but with getting the rest of the world on board?
What your posts demonstrate, to me, is precisely the arrogant, of-course-I’m-right attitude of the Bush administration that doesn’t do much when it comes to assembling broad support – and please contrast this with Bush 1 and Jim Baker. It’s no secret that Bush is famously incurious, famously isolated, and famously uninterested in the opinions of anyone other than his group of yes-men. I think an argument can be made to support an invasion of Iraq *if done correctly*, but I think it’s also true that this president, in particular, was uniquely unsuited for the task at hand.
[/q]
another great point was brought up by Dread. he linked to this article from the right wing National Review:
[q]Resolution 1483 wisely limits the U.N.'s role to one of consultation and coordination, given its manifest failures at nation building in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.
Resolution 1483 puts the Security Council in the curious position of legitimizing the postwar Anglo-American military occupation of Iraq without ever having addressed how U.S. and British forces got there in the first place. This is not, however, unfamiliar territory for the council. In the run-up to NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the chief proponents of intervention — once again, the Americans and the British — decided not to seek Security Council authorization in the face of a certain Russian (and possible Chinese) veto, even though the council had repeatedly determined that the situation in Kosovo was a "threat to international peace and security" — the legal predicate for mandatory sanctions and military action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. After Serb forces were driven from Kosovo by a U.S.-led air campaign, Resolution 1244 retroactively ratified the settlement terms that NATO imposed on the defeated Serbs without the council ever voting on the legality or legitimacy of the military action that brought about the settlement. Then, as now, the Security Council chose to overlook the elephant in the room.
Connoisseurs of Security Council precedent will note that the council has now bestowed retroactive legitimacy on military intervention against a member state in precisely the same number of instances (twice) that it has granted prior authorization for armed intervention in interstate conflicts (Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990-1). So much for the council's claimed monopoly on prior approval of all arguably nondefensive uses of military force.
Resolution 1483 also marks the demise of the so-called Axis of Weasels, that unnatural ménage a trios pulled apart by the centripetal forces of divergent national interests among the French, Germans, and Russians. This bouleversement — a reversal of fortune in the diplomatic parlance of Old Europe — has left Paris increasingly isolated as Berlin and Moscow set about conciliating Washington. Hence the uncharacteristically emollient tone struck Thursday by France's egregious foreign minister, M. de Villepin. "Even if this text does not go as far as we would like," he said, "we have decided to vote for this resolution. This is because we have chosen the path of unity of the international community." One hopes this path of unity is reachable only by way of a steep learning curve demonstrating the consequences of gratuitously obstructing vital U.S. national interests.
This is a teachable moment for the U.N. as well. Where vital U.S. national interests are at stake, the U.N.'s remaining relevance and authority depend entirely on that body's willingness to assist or at least acquiesce in U.S. efforts to maintain minimum world public order. This remains to be seen.[/q]
waterboarding Ann Coulter ...
