Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Council on Foreign Relations
February 2003
The following is a summary of a discussion and recommendations by participants in a Roundtable organized by the U.S./Middle East Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. These views are their own.
I. We support President George W. Bush's view that the Palestinian people deserve political leadership and institutions not tainted by terrorism and corruption. However, the resumption of a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians should not be conditioned upon the replacement of a particular individual. To do so invites resistance on the part of large segments of the Palestinian population that desire change in their leadership and accountable democratic governance, but do not wish to be seen as doing a foreign country's bidding. It also places the role of one man above the American interest in bringing a speedy end to the violence.
We believe nothing is better calculated to encourage the change within Palestinian society and its political institutions advocated by President Bush and widely desired by the Palestinian people than a peace process that holds out a credible promise of viable Palestinian statehood, as elaborated in III below.
II. All previous efforts to end violence on both sides and turn to a political process (the Mitchell recommendations, the Tenet cease-fire work plan and the Zinni mission) have failed to gain traction on the ground, primarily because each side maintained that the first step must be taken by the other.
If the Road Map is not to encounter the same fate, the U.S. administration and its Quartet partners must insist on a 100% PA effort to end violence that is unconditional and independent of actions demanded of Israel. The U.S. and its Quartet partners must similarly insist on an equally unconditional cessation of Israeli settlement expansion (including so-called natural growth) that is independent of actions required of Palestinians.
This parallelism is not to suggest moral equivalence. It is to recognize that no peace talks are possible if Palestinians fail to exert 100% effort to halt Palestinian terrorism or if Israel continues through its settlement policy to encroach on Palestinian lives and property. No matter how incommensurate, both must cease unconditionally and without reward as a necessary precondition for the political process envisioned in the Road Map.
The Road Map should present specific standards of compliance for the Palestinians with regard to their efforts to stop terror and for the Israelis with respect to settlement activity. It should offer a detailed security plan which spells out what each side must do in order to be deemed in compliance. The plan should provide for an independent mechanism to monitor implementation.
III. Most important by far to the success of the Road Map is a more explicit description of the two-state outcome it envisions. President Bush, acting on his own or through the Quartet, should articulate a clearer vision of the viable and independent Palestinian state he spoke of in his speech of June 24.
This fuller articulation should specify that the agreement envisioned by the U.S. and its Quartet partners that would end the conflict within a 3-year period should result in (a) two independent states with boundaries approximating pre-June '67 borders, with territorial adjustments that are the result of negotiation and not unilateral annexation; (b) arrangements for Jerusalem that accommodate two separate sovereignties while - insofar as possible - keeping the city physically undivided; (c) relief and justice for Palestinian refugees in ways that do not threaten Israel's demographic balance (e.g. a "right of return" to the new state of Palestine, a limited return to Israel under the rubric of family reunion, and generous international funding for repatriation, resettlement and compensation); (d) a protection regime for sites deemed holy by Jews, Christians and Moslems, and (e) agreement on arrangements for internal and external security.
IV. We believe there is no national security reason for the President to delay elaboration of his June 24 vision. Indeed, there are important national security reasons to spell out without further delay the broad shape of the peace agreement for which the U.S. intends to work. Arab countries and much of the Muslim world, as well as most European countries, see a direct linkage between their ability to be more forthcoming in supporting U.S. goals in Iraq and our seriousness in working for a fair settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. That seriousness would be made evident by an elaboration of the President's June 24 vision along the lines noted above, even if it may not be possible for the U.S. to initiate immediately a full-court press for a Middle East peace agreement.
V. Phase II of the Road Map, designed to create a Palestinian state with "provisional borders," may well be one phase too many, for it is more likely to prevent the parties from ever getting to Phase III in which permanent status issues are to be resolved. We believe the time, energy, and political capital spent on "provisional borders" are far better invested in negotiations for permanent borders. The resumption of effective security cooperation in Phase I (facilitated by internationally appointed monitors) should enable the parties to turn directly to permanent status issues. And the more detailed parameters of the president's twostate vision would help give the parties a workable framework within which to come to closure. The way station of provisional boundaries is a dangerous distraction.
If agreement on permanent borders is reached in the second stage, provision can be made for an interim period during which Palestinians will enjoy less than full sovereignty within these borders while they demonstrate their capacity and willingness to provide effective security for Israel, monitored by an international instrumentality.
In sum, we believe that by better defining the Road Map's destination, the U.S. and its Quartet partners can frame eventual permanent status negotiations in a manner that promotes a sustainable two-state outcome consistent with both sides' interests, that associates them with the moderate majorities in both camps, and that encourages Palestinians to undertake necessary fundamental changes in their institutions. It would also facilitate international cooperation with the U.S. in its war on global terrorism and in its efforts to encourage the spread of democracy throughout the world.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); former National Security Advisor
Lee H. Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies & Special Congressional September 11 Committee; former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
Frederic Hof, AALC Ltd.; former senior State and Defense Department official and former Staff Director of the Mitchell Committee
Geoffrey Kemp, Nixon Center; former National Security Council Senior Director for Middle East Affairs
Robert Malley, International Crisis Group; former National Security Council Director for Middle East Affairs
Thomas R. Pickering, Boeing Corporation; former Under Secretary of State and ambassador to Israel and India
Brent Scowcroft, Forum for International Policy, former National Security Advisor
Henry Siegman, Council on Foreign Relations
Stephen Solarz, International Crisis Group; former U.S. Representative (D-NY)
Theodore C. Sorensen, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison; former Special Counsel to the President
James Steinberg, Brookings Institution; former Deputy National Security Advisor
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
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Council on Foreign Relations
February 2003
The following is a summary of a discussion and recommendations by participants in a Roundtable organized by the U.S./Middle East Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. These views are their own.
I. We support President George W. Bush's view that the Palestinian people deserve political leadership and institutions not tainted by terrorism and corruption. However, the resumption of a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians should not be conditioned upon the replacement of a particular individual. To do so invites resistance on the part of large segments of the Palestinian population that desire change in their leadership and accountable democratic governance, but do not wish to be seen as doing a foreign country's bidding. It also places the role of one man above the American interest in bringing a speedy end to the violence.
We believe nothing is better calculated to encourage the change within Palestinian society and its political institutions advocated by President Bush and widely desired by the Palestinian people than a peace process that holds out a credible promise of viable Palestinian statehood, as elaborated in III below.
II. All previous efforts to end violence on both sides and turn to a political process (the Mitchell recommendations, the Tenet cease-fire work plan and the Zinni mission) have failed to gain traction on the ground, primarily because each side maintained that the first step must be taken by the other.
If the Road Map is not to encounter the same fate, the U.S. administration and its Quartet partners must insist on a 100% PA effort to end violence that is unconditional and independent of actions demanded of Israel. The U.S. and its Quartet partners must similarly insist on an equally unconditional cessation of Israeli settlement expansion (including so-called natural growth) that is independent of actions required of Palestinians.
This parallelism is not to suggest moral equivalence. It is to recognize that no peace talks are possible if Palestinians fail to exert 100% effort to halt Palestinian terrorism or if Israel continues through its settlement policy to encroach on Palestinian lives and property. No matter how incommensurate, both must cease unconditionally and without reward as a necessary precondition for the political process envisioned in the Road Map.
The Road Map should present specific standards of compliance for the Palestinians with regard to their efforts to stop terror and for the Israelis with respect to settlement activity. It should offer a detailed security plan which spells out what each side must do in order to be deemed in compliance. The plan should provide for an independent mechanism to monitor implementation.
III. Most important by far to the success of the Road Map is a more explicit description of the two-state outcome it envisions. President Bush, acting on his own or through the Quartet, should articulate a clearer vision of the viable and independent Palestinian state he spoke of in his speech of June 24.
This fuller articulation should specify that the agreement envisioned by the U.S. and its Quartet partners that would end the conflict within a 3-year period should result in (a) two independent states with boundaries approximating pre-June '67 borders, with territorial adjustments that are the result of negotiation and not unilateral annexation; (b) arrangements for Jerusalem that accommodate two separate sovereignties while - insofar as possible - keeping the city physically undivided; (c) relief and justice for Palestinian refugees in ways that do not threaten Israel's demographic balance (e.g. a "right of return" to the new state of Palestine, a limited return to Israel under the rubric of family reunion, and generous international funding for repatriation, resettlement and compensation); (d) a protection regime for sites deemed holy by Jews, Christians and Moslems, and (e) agreement on arrangements for internal and external security.
IV. We believe there is no national security reason for the President to delay elaboration of his June 24 vision. Indeed, there are important national security reasons to spell out without further delay the broad shape of the peace agreement for which the U.S. intends to work. Arab countries and much of the Muslim world, as well as most European countries, see a direct linkage between their ability to be more forthcoming in supporting U.S. goals in Iraq and our seriousness in working for a fair settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. That seriousness would be made evident by an elaboration of the President's June 24 vision along the lines noted above, even if it may not be possible for the U.S. to initiate immediately a full-court press for a Middle East peace agreement.
V. Phase II of the Road Map, designed to create a Palestinian state with "provisional borders," may well be one phase too many, for it is more likely to prevent the parties from ever getting to Phase III in which permanent status issues are to be resolved. We believe the time, energy, and political capital spent on "provisional borders" are far better invested in negotiations for permanent borders. The resumption of effective security cooperation in Phase I (facilitated by internationally appointed monitors) should enable the parties to turn directly to permanent status issues. And the more detailed parameters of the president's twostate vision would help give the parties a workable framework within which to come to closure. The way station of provisional boundaries is a dangerous distraction.
If agreement on permanent borders is reached in the second stage, provision can be made for an interim period during which Palestinians will enjoy less than full sovereignty within these borders while they demonstrate their capacity and willingness to provide effective security for Israel, monitored by an international instrumentality.
In sum, we believe that by better defining the Road Map's destination, the U.S. and its Quartet partners can frame eventual permanent status negotiations in a manner that promotes a sustainable two-state outcome consistent with both sides' interests, that associates them with the moderate majorities in both camps, and that encourages Palestinians to undertake necessary fundamental changes in their institutions. It would also facilitate international cooperation with the U.S. in its war on global terrorism and in its efforts to encourage the spread of democracy throughout the world.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); former National Security Advisor
Lee H. Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies & Special Congressional September 11 Committee; former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
Frederic Hof, AALC Ltd.; former senior State and Defense Department official and former Staff Director of the Mitchell Committee
Geoffrey Kemp, Nixon Center; former National Security Council Senior Director for Middle East Affairs
Robert Malley, International Crisis Group; former National Security Council Director for Middle East Affairs
Thomas R. Pickering, Boeing Corporation; former Under Secretary of State and ambassador to Israel and India
Brent Scowcroft, Forum for International Policy, former National Security Advisor
Henry Siegman, Council on Foreign Relations
Stephen Solarz, International Crisis Group; former U.S. Representative (D-NY)
Theodore C. Sorensen, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison; former Special Counsel to the President
James Steinberg, Brookings Institution; former Deputy National Security Advisor
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
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Iraq 
