The Committee on Foreign Relations had a group that toured Iraq at the request of Donald Rumsfeld. They made seven key recommendations to the government about what they see as key to success in Iraq.
[Q]The group identifies seven critical goals and makes specific recommendations to accomplish them:
Establish public safety in all parts of the country. Virtually every Iraqi and most CPA and coalition military officials cited this as their number one concern. The current configuration of composite security forces (U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) does not adequately support the reconstruction mission.
Expand Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process at the national, provincial and local levels, and ensure success of the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council.
Put people to work and provide basic economic and social services immediately. Short term public works projects are needed, as is a massive micro-credit program.
Decentralize reconstruction efforts. They are too big to be handled exclusively by the central occupying authority and national Iraqi Governing Council.
Implement a concerted, even relentless full-scale marketing campaign to effect a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind-from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.
Quickly mobilize and broaden a new reconstruction coalition that includes countries and organizations beyond the original war fighting coalition.
Make money more forthcoming and more flexible. "Business as usual" is not an option for operations in Iraq, nor can it be for their funding. CPA will need supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal year 2004, and oil revenue projections for the next few years are low. [/Q]
The whole report is here:
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf
I just want to point out that some of the seven things mentioned above, have been argued in here by some very intelligent people. Maybe Mr. Rumsfeld could save some time and just visit this area of the web?
[Q]The group identifies seven critical goals and makes specific recommendations to accomplish them:
Establish public safety in all parts of the country. Virtually every Iraqi and most CPA and coalition military officials cited this as their number one concern. The current configuration of composite security forces (U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) does not adequately support the reconstruction mission.
Expand Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process at the national, provincial and local levels, and ensure success of the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council.
Put people to work and provide basic economic and social services immediately. Short term public works projects are needed, as is a massive micro-credit program.
Decentralize reconstruction efforts. They are too big to be handled exclusively by the central occupying authority and national Iraqi Governing Council.
Implement a concerted, even relentless full-scale marketing campaign to effect a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind-from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.
Quickly mobilize and broaden a new reconstruction coalition that includes countries and organizations beyond the original war fighting coalition.
Make money more forthcoming and more flexible. "Business as usual" is not an option for operations in Iraq, nor can it be for their funding. CPA will need supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal year 2004, and oil revenue projections for the next few years are low. [/Q]
The whole report is here:
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf
I just want to point out that some of the seven things mentioned above, have been argued in here by some very intelligent people. Maybe Mr. Rumsfeld could save some time and just visit this area of the web?
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