HelloAngel
ONE love, blood, life
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/business/23LOCK.html/
Master Key Copying Revealed
By JOHN SCHWARTZ
A security researcher has revealed a little-known vulnerability in many locks that lets a person create a copy of the master key for an entire building by starting with any key from that building.
The researcher, Matt Blaze of AT&T Labs-Research, found the vulnerability by applying his area of expertise ? the security flaws that allow hackers to break into computer networks ? to the real-world locks and keys that have been used for more than a century in office buildings, college campuses and some residential complexes.
The attack described by Mr. Blaze, which is known by some locksmiths, leaves no evidence of tampering. It can be used without resorting to removing the lock and taking it apart or other suspicious behavior that can give away ordinary lock pickers.
All that is needed, Mr. Blaze wrote, is access to a key and to the lock that it opens, as well as a small number of uncut key blanks and a tool to cut them to the proper shape. No special skills or tools are required; key-cutting machines costing hundreds of dollars apiece make the task easier, but the same results can be achieved with a simple metal file.
After testing the technique repeatedly against the hardware from major lock companies, Mr. Blaze wrote, "it required only a few minutes to carry out, even when using a file to cut the keys."
AT&T decided that the risk of abuse of the information was great, so it has taken the unusual step of posting an alert to law enforcement agencies nationwide. The alert describes the technique and the possible defenses against it, though the company warns that no simple solution exists.
The paper, which Mr. Blaze has submitted for publication in a computer security journal, has troubled security experts who have seen it. Marc Weber Tobias, a locks expert who works as a security consultant to law enforcement agencies, said he was rewriting his police guide to locks and lock-picking because of the paper. He said the technique could open doors worldwide for criminals and terrorists. "I view the problem as pretty serious," he said, adding that the technique was so simple, "an idiot could do it."
The technique is not news to locksmiths, said Lloyd Seliber, the head instructor of master-key classes for Schlage, a lock company that is part of Ingersoll-Rand. He said he even taught the technique, which he calls decoding, in his training program for locksmiths.
"This has been true for 150 years," Mr. Seliber said.
Variations on the decoding technique have also been mentioned in passing in locksmith trade journals, but usually as a way for locksmiths to replace a lost master key and not as a security risk.
When told that Mr. Seliber taught the technique to his students, Mr. Tobias said: "He may teach it, but it's new in the security industry. Security managers don't know about it."
In the paper, Mr. Blaze applies the principles of cryptanalysis, ordinarily used to break secret codes, to the analysis of mechanical lock designs. He describes a logical, deductive approach to learning the shape of a master key by building on clues provided by the key in hand ? an approach that cryptanalysts call an oracle attack. The technique narrows the number of tries that would be necessary to discover a master-key configuration to only dozens of attempts, not the thousands of blind tries that would otherwise be necessary.
The research paper might seem an odd choice of topics for a computer scientist, but Mr. Blaze noted that in his role as a security researcher for AT&T Labs, he examined issues that went to the heart of business security wherever they arose, whether in the digital world or the world of steel and brass.
Since publishing Mr. Blaze's technique could lead to an increase in thefts and other crimes, it presented an ethical quandary for him and for AT&T Labs ? the kind of quandary that must also be confronted whenever new security holes are discovered in computing.
"There's no way to warn the good guys without also alerting the bad guys," Mr. Blaze said. "If there were, then it would be much simpler ? we would just tell the good guys."
Publishing a paper about vulnerable locks, however, presented greater challenges than a paper on computer flaws.
To read the rest of the article, visit:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/business/23LOCK.html/
Master Key Copying Revealed
By JOHN SCHWARTZ
A security researcher has revealed a little-known vulnerability in many locks that lets a person create a copy of the master key for an entire building by starting with any key from that building.
The researcher, Matt Blaze of AT&T Labs-Research, found the vulnerability by applying his area of expertise ? the security flaws that allow hackers to break into computer networks ? to the real-world locks and keys that have been used for more than a century in office buildings, college campuses and some residential complexes.
The attack described by Mr. Blaze, which is known by some locksmiths, leaves no evidence of tampering. It can be used without resorting to removing the lock and taking it apart or other suspicious behavior that can give away ordinary lock pickers.
All that is needed, Mr. Blaze wrote, is access to a key and to the lock that it opens, as well as a small number of uncut key blanks and a tool to cut them to the proper shape. No special skills or tools are required; key-cutting machines costing hundreds of dollars apiece make the task easier, but the same results can be achieved with a simple metal file.
After testing the technique repeatedly against the hardware from major lock companies, Mr. Blaze wrote, "it required only a few minutes to carry out, even when using a file to cut the keys."
AT&T decided that the risk of abuse of the information was great, so it has taken the unusual step of posting an alert to law enforcement agencies nationwide. The alert describes the technique and the possible defenses against it, though the company warns that no simple solution exists.
The paper, which Mr. Blaze has submitted for publication in a computer security journal, has troubled security experts who have seen it. Marc Weber Tobias, a locks expert who works as a security consultant to law enforcement agencies, said he was rewriting his police guide to locks and lock-picking because of the paper. He said the technique could open doors worldwide for criminals and terrorists. "I view the problem as pretty serious," he said, adding that the technique was so simple, "an idiot could do it."
The technique is not news to locksmiths, said Lloyd Seliber, the head instructor of master-key classes for Schlage, a lock company that is part of Ingersoll-Rand. He said he even taught the technique, which he calls decoding, in his training program for locksmiths.
"This has been true for 150 years," Mr. Seliber said.
Variations on the decoding technique have also been mentioned in passing in locksmith trade journals, but usually as a way for locksmiths to replace a lost master key and not as a security risk.
When told that Mr. Seliber taught the technique to his students, Mr. Tobias said: "He may teach it, but it's new in the security industry. Security managers don't know about it."
In the paper, Mr. Blaze applies the principles of cryptanalysis, ordinarily used to break secret codes, to the analysis of mechanical lock designs. He describes a logical, deductive approach to learning the shape of a master key by building on clues provided by the key in hand ? an approach that cryptanalysts call an oracle attack. The technique narrows the number of tries that would be necessary to discover a master-key configuration to only dozens of attempts, not the thousands of blind tries that would otherwise be necessary.
The research paper might seem an odd choice of topics for a computer scientist, but Mr. Blaze noted that in his role as a security researcher for AT&T Labs, he examined issues that went to the heart of business security wherever they arose, whether in the digital world or the world of steel and brass.
Since publishing Mr. Blaze's technique could lead to an increase in thefts and other crimes, it presented an ethical quandary for him and for AT&T Labs ? the kind of quandary that must also be confronted whenever new security holes are discovered in computing.
"There's no way to warn the good guys without also alerting the bad guys," Mr. Blaze said. "If there were, then it would be much simpler ? we would just tell the good guys."
Publishing a paper about vulnerable locks, however, presented greater challenges than a paper on computer flaws.
To read the rest of the article, visit:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/business/23LOCK.html/
Yeah, why would anyone get the opportunity to copy it?
